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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

The court concluded that the agreement did not give Nestle any vested
rights and did not legally commit the District to any definite course of
action because the agreement was dependant on many contingencies,
including full compliance with CEQA. Further, the court noted that
because of the lack of specificity in the details of the proposed project,
preparation of an environmental review would have been premature.
The court set aside the trial court's judgment granting Concerned
McCloud Citizen's petition for writ of mandate and remanded the case
to the lower court with instructions to enter a new judgment denying
the petition.
Jacob Schlesinger
County of Imperial v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the California Environmental Quality Act
requires water districts to be named as parties in county's actions, and
unnamed water districts were indispensable parties).
Imperial Irrigation District ("Imperial") and San Diego County Water Authority ("San Diego") entered into an agreement to transfer
200,000 acre feet of water per year ("afy") and agreed to conserve
100,000 afy for possible future acquisition by The Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California ("Metropolitan") and Coachella Valley
Water District ("Coachella"). The State Water Resources Control
Board ("Board") approved this transfer. The County of Imperial
("County") filed two petitions challenging aspects of the Board's approval under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA").
Neither petition named Metropolitan or Coachella as a party. Imperial
demurred and argued that the County failed to name Metropolitan or
Coachella, who were indispensable parties in both proceedings. The
trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, finding
Metropolitan and Coachella were indispensable parties and that the
statute of limitations had run. County filed a petition for a writ of
mandate and argued the trial court abused its discretion. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling.
On appeal, County challenged the Board's approval of Imperial
and San Diego's transfer and challenged the transfer under CEQA.
However, the main issue of dispute was whether Metropolitan and
Coachella were indispensable parties. Therefore, the court only addressed this limited procedural issue.
Imperial, Metropolitan and Coachella all possess water rights on
the Colorado River as part of the Seven Party Agreement. Imperial is
the largest single holder of water rights on the Colorado River in California, and it provides enough water to irrigate 500,000 acres and delivers waters for other services. All three entities have their water rights
linked in a priority system, with Imperial having the highest priority
rights and thus the ability to divert its full right to water before Metro-
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politan being able to divert any. San Diego does not possess any water
rights to the Colorado River. Therefore, the diversion of water from
Imperial to San Diego and the priority system created the conflict
among these water entities.
In 1998, Imperial and San Diego proposed an initial agreement
where Imperial would exchange 300,000 afy of Colorado River water in
return for money for up to 75 years. This long-term transfer required
approval by the Board, which has authority to approve a requested
transfer as long as the transfer does not substantially injure any legal
user of water or unreasonably affect the environment. Metropolitan
and Coachella protested this transfer and contended that the transfer
violated their priority rights under the Seven Party Agreement.
While the transfer petition was pending, multiple states and agencies negotiated the quantification settlement agreement ("QSA") in an
effort to control water use from the Colorado River. Under the QSA,
the transfer of water from agricultural to urban uses formed a key element. The Imperial to San Diego transfer was the largest such transfer.
In order to resolve Coachella and Metropolitan's objections to the
proposed transfer of water from Imperial to San Diego, Coachella and
Metropolitan entered into the Protest Dismissal Agreement ("PDA").
The PDA amended the transfer petition so that only 200,000 afy would
be transferred per year from Imperial to San Diego and the remaining
100,000 afy would be available for acquisition by Metropolitan and
Coachella. The Board sent out a public notice stating the approval of
the acquisition would be approval of a transfer. In December 2002, the
Board approved Imperial and San Diego's transfer petition.
In January 2003 and November 2003, the County filed two cases,
No. 82 and No. 876, challenging the transfer. The Court later coordinated these two cases. The County failed to name Metropolitan and
Coachella as parties. Imperial filed demurrers in both cases, arguing
the County failed to name Metropolitan and Coachella, as they are
indispensable parties. The trial court sustained the demurrers on indispensable party grounds and granted leave to amend. The County
then amended its petitions, including Metropolitan and Coachella as
parties. Metropolitan, Coachella, and San Diego then filed joint demurrers, arguing Metropolitan and Coachella could not be added after
the statute of limitations had run. The trial court found Metropolitan
and Coachella indispensable parties in the cases and sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. The trial court found that the County did not timely name Metropolitan and Coachella in its petitions and
that they qualified as indispensable parties because they had interests
divergent from those of the named parties that might be impaired by
the litigation. The County challenged the trial court's order.
The court reviewed the ruling under California Code of Civil Procedure section 389 for abuse of discretion. Section 389 states in pertinent part that a party is necessary if "he claims an interest relating to
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the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absences may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest." Section 389 goes on to state that if a
party is necessary and cannot be made a party the court should determine whether the action should proceed with the parties named, or
should be dismissed with prejudice. One factor the court should consider is to what extent a judgment entered in the parties' absence
would be prejudicial. The court should consider these factors with
fairness and equity in mind. The court also considered CEQA, which
requires that the courts should avoid thwarting the purpose if CEQA
through harsh application of the indispensable parties rule. The underlying policy of CEQA is to inform the public and decision makers of
any environmental consequence of a proposed project.
In its decision, the court also examined section 21167.6.5 of the
Public Resources Code, which requires naming approval recipients in
CEQA litigation and includes any recipient of approval. The court
found Metropolitan and Coachella within the class of transferees the
Legislature sought to protect as "recipients of approval" under section
21167.6.5. The court found that the named parties were covered under section 21167.6.5 and had different interests than the other parties
named in the action because of their different functions with respect
to the water. In determining that Metropolitan and Coachella were
recipients of approval, the court looked to the status of the proposed
transfer. The court found that because the Board's order unambiguously approved the future transfer of 100,000 afy of water to Metropolitan and Coachella, those parties were recipients of approval under
section 21167.6.5.
The court then reviewed the ruling for abuse of discretion. The
court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in finding that the
unnamed districts were indispensable parties and that potential prejudice exists, namely the loss of 100,000 afy under the transfer agreement
and the potential affect on the DSA. The court noted that the County
did not fashion any relief to avoid prejudice. Furthermore, the court
noted that Metropolitan and Coachella had differing interests in the
proceeding than Imperial, San Diego, and the County, and that the
County had other forums in which to challenge the adequacy of the
original petition. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling
and denied the County's petition.
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